When Crime Pays by Milan Vaishnav

Author:Milan Vaishnav
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2016-06-20T16:00:00+00:00

Possible Objections

Before proceeding, it is worth considering several possible objections one could raise with this logic. One potential critique is that this argument disregards the multiplicity of discrete caste or tribal (jati) identities that exist within the larger SC/ST headings. “Scheduled Caste” and “Scheduled Tribe” are umbrella groups consisting of many individual jatis, or subgroups. As with most caste groupings, such as “upper caste” or OBC, SCs and STs are internally quite diverse. While this is certainly a valid critique, there is some debate about how salient specific jatis within the larger SC category are in the political realm, given Dalits’ common historical struggle.30

Even if it is the case that jati-based competition is in play, incorporating jatis does not substantively change the analysis for at least three reasons. For starters, emphasizing divisions among SCs/STs is a questionable political strategy for politicians to adopt in reserved constituencies because it only further subdivides the minority vote. A criminal candidate who mobilizes voters from only his own SC/ST jati limits his appeal; the incentives are to cater to the median voter.

Second, a candidate in a reserved constituency could mobilize along jati lines, but he or she is unlikely to be able to have access to the tools necessary to build a minimum winning coalition given the realities of the caste hierarchy. In many instances, candidates have to construct a coalition in order to win an election, which forces them to attract support beyond their own community. Here too there are divergent incentives in open versus reserved seats. In open seats, suspected criminal candidates from the dominant group(s) can use coercion and/or redistribution to add to their core ethnic voter base. Social groups on the bottom rungs of the caste hierarchy will be more vulnerable to such tactics. The situation is likely to be different in reserved seats, where criminally suspect candidates from reserved minority communities will be less able to wield coercion and/or redistribution to win support from dominant groups. Groups higher up on the caste hierarchy, due to their relative wealth and their superior social status, are likely to resist such tactics and be generally unwilling to support candidates who are harder to control or bend to their will.

Finally, it is true that candidates linked to criminality can sometimes gain support from voters who are not co-ethnics due to negative voting. For instance, a low-caste Dalit may vote for an upper-caste Brahmin strongman because he thinks electing a Brahmin is a better outcome than electing a Yadav. In reserved constituencies, negative voting is less relevant because all the candidates are from the same community.31 In a reserved constituency, a Brahmin voter does not have to make the trade-off of supporting a criminal ST candidate to ensure another group he dislikes (or another group he dislikes even more) comes to power because reservation disqualifies anyone else from contesting elections.

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